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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVIDENCE-Substantive Use
of Witness' Prior Inconsistent Statement Does Not Violate
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitiution.
In January, 1967, Melvin Porter was arrested for selling marijuana.
While in custody he named John Green as his source of supply. At
Green's preliminary hearing, Porter, with some variations from his ear-
lier story, again named John Green as his source of supply. Porter
testified under oath and was cross-examined by Green's counsel, the
same counsel who represented Green at his subsequent trial. At
Green's trial, Porter changed his testimony, stating that he could not
remember who had supplied the marijuana since he had been on LSD
at the time of the sale. During Porter's direct examination, the prose-
cution introduced both Porter's prior inconsistent testimony from the
preliminary hearing, and a statement by a police officer that Porter had
named Green as his supplier while in custody. These statements were
admitted as substantive evidence under Section 1235 of the California
Evidence Code.' The District Court of Appeals reversed,2 holding that
the substantive use of Porter's prior statements denied Green his con-
stitutional right of confrontation.' The California Supreme Court af-
firmed4 the reversal, holding Section 1235 unconstitutional as violative
of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment since it allowed
the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.
The United States Supreme Court in California v. Green' vacated
the decision of the California court, stating that the orthodox hearsay
rule limiting the use of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment
purposes is not incorporated in the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause. The Court held that the defendant's constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him is not violated by the substan-
1. "Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is
offered in compliance with Section 770." Cal. Evid. Code § 1235 (West 1966) Sec.
770 provides that "extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness that is incon-
sistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded unless: (a) the
witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or
to deny the statement." Cal. Evid. Code § 770 (West 1966).
2. 71 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1968).
3. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." United States Constitution, Amendment VI.
4. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
5. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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tive use of prior inconsistent statements, where the witness is present at
trial, subject to cross-examination, and there is opportunity to test him
as to the basis of his former statement.6 Furthermore, the Court stated
that Porter's preliminary hearing testimony would be constitutionally
admissible even if there were no opportunity for confrontation at the
trial since those statements had been given "under circumstances closely
approximating those that surround the typical trial."'
Due to the fact that Porter's statement while in custody was not then
subject to cross-examination, the Court remanded the case for consid-
eration of the question whether Porter's later inability to remember pre-
cluded effective cross-examination at trial.'
The decision in Green establishes that the proscriptions of the hear-
say rule with its myriad exceptions are not equivalent to the prohibitions
of the confrontation clause. Although the court found that there would
be some "overlap" between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation
Clause, its decision lends support to states' attempts to reform, and ex-
periment with, their evidentiary requirements. Further, the Court's
decision that statement's given "under circumstances closely approxi-
mating those that surround the typical trial" are admissible, absent an
opportunity for confrontation at a subsequent trial, makes the pre-
liminary hearing a more critical stage in the criminal process.
The classic enunciation of the orthodox hearsay rule is found in
State v. Saporen.9 In that case, Nathan Saporen was convicted of the
crime of carnal knowledge and abuse of a female under the age of
eighteen. At the trial, the prosecution had fixed the date of the offense
as November 2, 1937, and the place of occurrence at a boarding house.
One of the witnesses for the state testified that he had seen the prose-
cuting witness at that boarding house in late October. Claiming sur-
prise, the state introduced prior inconsistent statements of the witness
which not only placed the prosecuting witness at the boarding house on
November 2, but the defendant as well.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, that court held that
the previous inconsistent statements of the witness could not be utilized
as substantive evidence.1" The court reasoned that such evidence could
6. Id. at p. 164.
7. Id. at p. 165.
8. Id. at pp. 168-170.
9. 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
10. Most legal commentators have urged the adoption of the view that permits the
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements because the hearsay dangers are non-
existent when the witness testifies at trial. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 (3d ed.
1940), Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
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not be admitted for substantive purposes pursuant to the hearsay rule
because they were out of court declarations given without oath and test
of cross-examination." The court focused on the importance of con-
temporaneous cross-examination to the fact-finding process.
The chief merit of cross-examination is not that at some future
time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testi-
mony. Its principal virtue is in its immediate application of the
testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testi-
mony is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth
in proportion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration
and influence by the suggestion of others, whose interest may be,
and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth.12
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Johnson,'3 interpreted the
Confrontation Clause as requiring adherence to the rationale of Saporen.
In Johnson, the court held that the admission of grand jury testimony vio-
lated the defendant's right of confrontation. The defendant had been
convicted of the crime of incest. At trial, the defendant's wife and
daughter denied that he ever had intercourse with the daughter. The
prosecutor then introduced the grand jury testimony of both the mother
and daughter in which they had testified that the defendant had en-
gaged in intercourse with his daughter a number of times.
The grand jury testimony was admitted pursuant to Section 1235
of the California Evidence Code.'4 The justification for this statutory
exception to the hearsay rule is that the declarant is present and testify-
ing in court. The declarant can be cross-examined as to the prior state-
ment and the factfinder has the opportunity to observe his demeanor as
he is questioned about the prior inconsistent statement. 15 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, however, did not agree that belated cross-ex-
amination effectively cured the lack of cross-examination at the time the
statement was made:
To assert that the dangers of hearsay are "largely non-existent"
when the declarant can be cross-examined at some later date, or
to urge that such a cross-examination puts the later trier of fact in
Harv. L. Rev. 177 (1948), C. McCormick, Evidence § 39 (1954), Uniform Rule of
Evidence 63 (1) (1953), Model Code of Evidence Rule 503(b) (1942), Jett v. Com-
monwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969), Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 103 N.W.2d
609 (1969), DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.),
cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925), United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1937)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 690 (1937).
11. 285 N.W. at p. 901.
12. Id.
13. 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1051 (1969).
14. Supra note 1.
15. 441 P.2datp. 117.
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"as good a position" to judge the truth of the out-of-court statement
as it is to judge contemporary trial testimony, is to disregard the
critical importance of timely cross-examination. 16
The court's analysis of the dynamics of the truthseeking process of a
trial led it to conclude that a cross-examination which did not immedi-
ately follow the elicitation of the statement was a constitutionally inade-
quate method for testing the truthfulness of the statement.
In People v. Green,'17 the California Supreme Court expanded its
holding in Johnson to prohibit the substantive use of preliminary hear-
ing testimony which had been subject to immediate cross-examination.
The court interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring not only
that cross-examination immediately follow the direct testimony, but
that the cross-examination should take place before the trier of fact who
must pass on the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given
his testimony. Once against the California Supreme Court examined
the role of cross-examination in the truth seeking process. The court
reasoned that the function of cross-examination was not limited to elicit-
ing a contradiction of the witnesses's direct testimony, but rather to
focusing the attention of the fact finder upon the demeanor of the
witness as he relates his story and then responds to the probing ques-
tions of the opposing attorney.' 8 The importance of demeanor in the
determination of the weight to be given testimonial evidence renders
the reading of the preliminary hearing transcript at the trial an inade-
quate substitute.' 9
Apart from the fact that the reading of a transcript does not allow
the factfinder to directly observe the demeanor of the witness as he
initially relates his story, there are important differences between the
cross-examination of a witness at the preliminary hearing and at the
trial. The purpose of the examination of a witness at a preliminary
hearing is to establish probable cause to hold the defendant for trial.
That limited purpose coupled with the fact that the preliminary hearing
is at an early stage in the judicial process are factors which usually influ-
ence defense counsel not to conduct a searching and aggressive cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing.
The court concluded that since, pursuant to the decision in Johnson,
cross-examination at trial relating to a previously given statement is
16. Id.
17. 451 P.2d 422.
18. Id. at p. 427.
19. With only one exception the transcript of Porter's cross-examination at the pre-
liminary hearing was not read to the court, 451 P.2d at p. 427 n. 5.
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inadequate, and that since timely cross-examination before someone
other than the ultimate trier of fact is inadequate, a combination of those
two invalid approaches is likewise constitutionally inadequate. 0
The decisions by the California Supreme Court in both Johnson and
Green overruling the judgment of the California legislature as to what
constituted reliable and relevant evidence, were influenced by what the
court considered to be the disapproving import of a recent trend of the
United States Supreme Court decisions.21
In Pointer v. Texas,2 the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case the defendant
was charged with robbery. At the preliminary hearing the victim of the
robbery, one Phillips, testified to it in detail and identified the defen-
dant as the one who perpetrated the crime. The defendant did not have
the assistance of counsel, nor did he attempt to cross-examine Phillips.
At trial, the prosecution, after showing that Phillips had moved and
did not intend to return to the jurisdiction, offered the transcript of
Phillips' testimony given at the preliminary hearing. The trial court
admitted the transcript over the objection of the defendant that it de-
nied him the right to confront the witnesses against him. The Supreme
Court reversed, stating:
Because the transcript of Phillips' statement offered against peti-
tioner *at his trial had not been taken at a time and under circum-
stances affording petitioner through counsel an adequate oppor-
tunity to cross-examine Phillips; its introduction in a federal court
in a criminal case against Pointer would have amounted to denial
of the privilege of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment. 23
However, the Court carefully differentiated its holding in Pointer
from a situation where the statements offered into evidence were taken
at a full-fledged hearing where the defendant was represented by coun-
sel who had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.2 4  Al-
though the Court did not delimit the scope of the constitutional right
of confrontation, it did state that the decision in Pointer did not affect
its previous recognition of the admissibility of dying declarations nor
of testimony of a deceased witness who testified at a former trial.25
20. Id. at 429.
21. 441 P.2d at p. 120, and 451 P.2d at p. 426.
22. 389 U.S. 400 (1965).
23. Id. at p. 407.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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The Court, in Douglas v. Alabama,28 again emphasized that one of
the primary interests secured by the Confrontation Clause was the right
of cross-examination. In that case Douglas and one Loyd were tried
separately for assault with intent to murder. Loyd's trial was first and
he was found guilty. The prosecution then called Loyd as a witness
at Douglas' trial, but Loyd, relying on the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, refused to answer any questions relating to the crime. The trial
judge ruled that the privilege was not available to Loyd because of his
conviction, but Loyd persisted in his refusal to answer any questions.
The prosecution, after Loyd was declared a hostile witness, then read
from a document later identified as Loyd's confession, with intermittent
pauses to ask Loyd if he made those statements. Loyd continued to
refuse to answer, but by this method the prosecution was able to get be-
fore the jury Loyd's previous confession which implicated Douglas.
The Supreme Court found that this procedure was a clear violation
of Douglas' right to confront the witnesses against him. The Court
stated that effective confrontation of Loyd was possible only if he ad-
mitted the statement was his. As matters stood, cross-examination of
Loyd as to the truthfulness and circumstances of the statement was im-
possible since he refused to respond to any questions about it. Also, the
Court held that cross-examination of the law enforcement officers who
testified that Loyd made the confession was inadequate because
corss-examination of the officers would only probe the question of
whether Loyd ever actually made the confession. Thus, all effective
avenues of cross-examination to test the veracity of the confession were
denied the defendant. Although the prosecution's reading of the al-
leged statement was not technically testimony, the Court reasoned that
the circumstances of its presentation and Loyd's refusal to answer would
be treated by the jury as the equivalent of testimony that the statement
had in fact been made by Loyd.
The Court was presented with a similar situation in Bruton v. United
States.27 In Bruton, the petitioner and one Evans were tried together
on a charge of armed postal robbery. Evans' oral confession, which
named the petitioner as his accomplice, was admitted into evidence
against Evans. Since Evans did not take the stand and could not be
questioned concerning the confession, the trial judge instructed the jury
that although the confession was competent evidence against Evans, it
26. 389 U.S. 415 (1965).
27. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
1971
Loyola University Law Journal
was inadmissible as hearsay against the petitioner. The Supreme Court
reversed Bruton's conviction, holding that:
[B]ecause of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial state-
ments in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confes-
sion in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examina-
tion secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment. 2
8
The decisions in Bruton, Douglas and Pointer reiterated that an op-
portunity for cross-examination was included in the protection afforded
by the Confrontation Clause, but nothing in these decisions gave sup-
port to the view that the elicitation of the statement and the cross-exami-
nation must necessarily occur at trial. Bruton, Douglas and Pointer
each concerned a situation where the statements were completely un-
tested by cross-examination. For the purposes of these decisions it was
not necessary for the Court to examine the relationship between the
traditional hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.
However, in Barber v. Page,2 9 the Supreme Court gave some indica-
tion as to the scope of the Confrontation Clause. In Barber, the
petitioner and one Woods were jointly charged with armed robbery. At
their preliminary hearing both the petitioner and Woods were repre-
sented by the same counsel, a Mr. Parks. During the hearing Woods
decided to waive his privilege against self-incrimination, whereupon
Parks withdrew as his attorney. Woods then gave testimony that in-
criminated petitioner, but Parks refrained from cross-examining Woods.
When petitioner was brought to trial in Oklahoma, Woods was then
imprisoned at the federal penitentiary in Texarkana, Texas. The prose-
cution then introduced the transcript of Woods' testimony from the
preliminary hearing on the ground that Woods was then unavailable be-
cause he was not within the jurisdiction. Petitioner's objection was
overruled, the transcript was read to the jury and, subsequently, the
petitioner was found guilty.
The Supreme Court recognized the traditional exception to the con-
frontation requirement where the witness is unavailable and has testi-
fied at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant who
then had an opportunity for cross-examinationA Although the Court
28. Id. at p. 126.
29. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
30. Id. at p. 722. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). In Mattox
the witness died before the second trial. His testimony from the first trial was then
admitted at the subsequent trial.
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assumed, for the purpose of its decision, that the petitioner had waived
his right of cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, it did not
agree that Woods was unavailable under the terms of the exception to
the confrontation requirement. Although the process of state courts
is of no force outside of the jurisdiction, the Court noted that there are
procedures by which federal prisoners are permitted to testify in state
courts.3 ' The Court stated that although permitting federal prisoners
to testify in state courts requires an exercise of discretion by federal au-
thorities, the state is not relieved of the obligation to make the re-
quest. Thus, the Court held that a witness was not unavailable under
the terms of the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial au-
thorities made a good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. How-
ever, the Court then went on to discuss the substitution of cross-ex-
amination at trial by cross-examination at a preliminary hearing:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both
the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to
weigh the demeanor of the witness. A prelimiinary hearing is or-
dinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case
than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of
determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for
trial. While there may be some justification for holding that the
opportunity for cross-examination of testimony at a preliminary
hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where
the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this is not as we
have pointed out, such a case.32
This language from the decision in Barber lent some support to the
California Supreme Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
in Johnson and Green, but the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in California v. Green rejected the view that cross-examina-
tion must take place at the same time as the direct testimony is given,
before the same trier of fact as must pass on the credibility of the wit-
ness and the weight of his testimony.
The Court, in California v. Green, began by establishing that the
Confrontation Clause did not incorporate the traditional hearsay rule
and its exceptions. The Court stated that it could not be automatically
assumed that evidence admitted in violation of the traditional hearsay
rule necessarily violated the confrontation requirements. In the
31. Id. at p. 723. The federal courts have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus
ad testificandum for prospective witnesses in federal custody upon the request of state
prosecutorial authorities, 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(5). Also the United States Bureau of
Prisons permits federal prisoners to testify in state court criminal proceedings pursuant
to writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued out of state courts. 390 U.S. at p. 724.
32. Id. at p. 725-726.
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Court's view, the motivation for the promulgation of the Confronta-
tion Clause "was the practice of trying defendants on 'evidence' which
consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions."3 In this manner
the defendant was denied a face to face encounter with his accuser be-
for the trier of fact. The core of the protection afforded by the Con-
frontation Clause was the literal right to confront the witness at the
trial. Historically, the Court found no reason to hold that admitting
a declarant's inconsistent out-of-court statements, when he is present
and testifying at the trial and subject to effective cross-examination, was
constitutionally inadequate.
An analysis of the purposes of the confrontation requirement pro-
vided an additional basis for the Court's decision. First, the Confron-
tation Clause requires that the witness testify under oath, causing the
witness to reflect on the seriousness of the occasion and the possibility
that a lie will be punished as perjury. Although at the time the out-of-
court statement is made it is not subject to the oath's protection, the
presence of the declarant at trial causes the statement to regain that pro-
tection in that the declarant must now affirm, deny, or qualify the ear-
lier statement while presently under oath. 4 Second, the Confronta-
tion Clause forces the witness to undergo the process of cross-exami-
nation in order to test his testimony. The out-of-court statement is not
tested by cross-examination, but the Court found that so long as effec-
tive cross-examination is available at trial, the earlier omission is not
of crucial significance. The main reason for this conclusion by the
Court is that at the time the prior inconsistent statements are introduced,
the witness is already telling a different story and, thus, one of the main
goals of a cross-examination has already been accomplished.15  Fi-
nally, the Confrontation Clause allows the trier of fact to examine the
demeanor of the witness as he makes his statements in order that the
trier of fact can assess the credibility of the witness and the weight to be
given his testimony. The Court admitted that in the case of prior in-
consistent statements the jury would be in a better position to evaluate
the truth of the statement if it could observe a cross-examination of
the declarant as he initially gives the statement. However, when prior
inconsistent statements are introduced, the witness must take a position
as to the truth or validity of that statement. The jury then has an oppor-
tunity to observe the witness' demeanor as he reacts to the questions
33. 399 U.S. at p. 156.
34. Id. at pp. 158-159.
35. Id. at p. 159.
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about the earlier statement. The Court held that, for the purposes
of the Confrontation Clause, subsequent cross-examination of an out-
of-court statement still gives the jury a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the statement.36
The Court exmphasized that none of its earlier decisions dealt with
the situation where out-of-court statements of a witness were admitted
when he was present and testifying at trial. Indeed, the decisions of
the Court finding that the Confrontation Clause had been violated
dealt with situations where the statements were admitted in the absence
of the declarant, and thus without any opportunity to cross-examine
him at trial."
The Supreme Court also held that Porter's preliminary hearing testi-
mony was constitutionally admissible even absent an effective oppor-
tunity for confrontation at trial because the circumstances under which
the statement was given approximated those of a trial. The Court
noted that it already had recognized the constitutionality of the prior
testimony exception to the hearsay rule,3" and it refused to find that the
preliminary hearing afforded Green differed substantially enough from
a trial to preclude the applicability of the prior testimony exception.
At Green's preliminary hearing, Porter testified under oath, Green's
counsel had an opportunity to conduct a cross-examination that was not
significantly limited as to scope, and the proceedings were conducted be-
fore a judicial tribunal which provided a record of the hearing.3 9 This
holding in Green was inconsistent with the implication of the Court's
reasoning in Barber that the more limited purpose of a preliminary
hearing rendered a cross-examination of the witness only at the hearing
constitutionally inadequate. The decision in Green limits the opinion
in Barber to the strict holding that the State had not made a good faith
effort to secure the witness for trial.4 ° The Court concluded that since
36. Id. at pp. 160-161.
37. Id. at p. 161. The Court even found support in Bruton for the substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements: "Indeed, Bruton's refusal to regard limiting instruc-
tions as capable of curing the error, suggests that there is little difference as far as the
Constitution is concerned between permitting prior inconsistent statements to be used
only for impeachment purposes, and permitting them to be used for substantive pur-
poses as well." 399 U.S. at p. 164.
38. Id. at p. 165.
39. Similarly Mr. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion in Green, agreed that:
[T]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment reaches no farther than
to require the prosecution to produce any available witness whose declara-
tions it seeks to use in a criminal trial. 399 U.S. at p. 174.
Thus, Justice Harlan concluded that in Green the State produced its witness and made
him available for trial confrontation. With that done, the Sixth Amendment reQuire-
ments were satisfied.
40. 399 U.S. at p. 167.
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the testimony would be admissible were the declarant actually unavail-
able, it was inconsistent to exclude the testimony when the declarant was
present and testifying at the trial. When the State actually produced the
witness at the trial, it was immaterial, in the Court's opinion, whether
that witness then claimed a loss of memory or simply refused to answer;
the State could constitutionally rely on his prior testimony.4 1
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Green raises the
possibility that defendants in criminal trials will be convicted largely on
the basis of out-of-court statements. Green, for example, was con-
victed mainly on the basis of Porter's statements of this type, and the
Supreme Court pointed out that on remand the California Supreme
Court might choose to set aside the conviction on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction." Thus, it appears likely
that the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Green will lead
to due process problems in future cases where the rules of evidence re-
flect the lenient attitude of the Supreme Court.
The Court's opinion in Green also creates a danger that preliminary
hearings will become more critically important and will tend to develop
into full-scale trials. The purpose of the preliminary hearing is the lim-
ited one of establishing reasonable credibility in the charges against the
defendant. Under these circumstances, it is not likely that defense
counsel would be willing to completely expose their case in view of the
greater likelihood that at this stage they would not succeed in exonerat-
ing the defendant. Also, at this beginning phase of the proceedings
against the defendant counsel may often lack adequate time for prep-
aration and investigation in order to conduct a thorough cross-examina-
tion. However, given the risk that the preliminary hearing testimony of
a witness might be used at trial, cautious counsel will be compelled to
seek delays in order to investigate and prepare for a thorough cross-
examination. The end result for a defendant could well be that the
already prolonged time to trial will only be further extended.
GERALD L. MOREL
41. Id. at p. 170.
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